Journal: Social Choice and Welfare

Volume 39, Issue 4

697 -- 719Joseph M. Ostroy, Uzi Segal. No externalities: a characterization of efficiency and incentive compatibility with public goods
721 -- 735René van den Brink. On hierarchies and communication
737 -- 749Juan Carlos Cesco. Hedonic games related to many-to-one matching problems
751 -- 782Laurent Simula, Alain Trannoy. Shall we keep the highly skilled at home? The optimal income tax perspective
783 -- 808Olivier Bargain, Olivier Donni. Targeting and child poverty
809 -- 831Christopher P. Chambers, Takashi Hayashi. Money-metric utilitarianism
833 -- 846Simon Grant, Atsushi Kajii, Ben Polak, Zvi Safra. A generalized representation theorem for Harsanyi's ('impartial') observer
847 -- 853Juan Carlos Candeal. Subgroup independence conditions on preferences
855 -- 867Conal Duddy, Ashley Piggins. A measure of distance between judgment sets
869 -- 889Susumu Cato. Social choice without the Pareto principle: a comprehensive analysis
891 -- 905Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Arkadii M. Slinko. Rationalizations of Condorcet-consistent rules via distances of hamming type
907 -- 918Dwight R. Bean. Proportional quota weighted voting system hierarchies II
919 -- 930Vincent Anesi. A new old solution for weak tournaments
931 -- 959Eric Gilson, Chelsey Cooley, William Ella, Michael Follett, Lorenzo Traldi. The Efron dice voting system

Volume 39, Issue 2-3

253 -- 257Vincent Merlin, Marc Fleurbaey, Dominique Lepelley. Introduction to the special issue on new developments in social choice and welfare theories
259 -- 272Amartya Sen. The reach of social choice theory
273 -- 302Brian Hill. Confidence in preferences
303 -- 321Wulf Gaertner. Evaluating sets of objects in characteristics space
323 -- 334Walter Bossert, Kotaro Suzumura. Quasi-transitive and Suzumura consistent relations
335 -- 352Salvador Barberà, Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno. Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences
353 -- 369Conal Duddy, Ashley Piggins. The proximity condition
371 -- 398M. Remzi Sanver, William S. Zwicker. Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules
399 -- 429Hans Peters, Souvik Roy, Ton Storcken. On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules
431 -- 455Gabrielle Demange. On the influence of a ranking system
457 -- 489Philippe De Donder, Michel Le Breton, Eugenio Peluso. On the (sequential) majority choice of public good size and location
491 -- 520Michel Le Breton, Peter Sudhölter, Vera Zaporozhets. Sequential legislative lobbying
521 -- 536Philip J. Reny, Eyal Winter, Myrna Wooders. The partnered core of a game with side payments
537 -- 552Anindya Bhattacharya, Abderrahmane Ziad. On credible coalitional deviations by prudent players
553 -- 565Hélène Ferrer, Guillermo Owen, Fabrice Valognes. Stable syndicates of factor owners and distribution of social output: a Shapley value approach
567 -- 597Katherine Cuff, Sunghoon Hong, Jesse A. Schwartz, Quan Wen, John A. Weymark. Dominant strategy implementation with a convex product space of valuations
599 -- 614Marc Fleurbaey. Social preferences for the evaluation of procedures
615 -- 631Steven J. Brams, D. Marc Kilgour, Christian Klamler. The undercut procedure: an algorithm for the envy-free division of indivisible items
633 -- 647Eugenio Peluso, Alain Trannoy. Preserving dominance relations through disaggregation: the evil and the saint
649 -- 673Claudio Zoli, Peter J. Lambert. Sequential procedures for poverty gap dominance
675 -- 696Anders Björklund, Markus Jäntti, John E. Roemer. Equality of opportunity and the distribution of long-run income in Sweden

Volume 39, Issue 1

1 -- 22Luisa Monroy, Francisco R. Fernández. Stable sets and cores for multi-criteria simple games and for their extensions
23 -- 33Itai Ashlagi, Flip Klijn. Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests
35 -- 57Tibor Neugebauer, Stefan Traub. Public good and private good valuation for waiting time reduction: a laboratory study
59 -- 89Efthymios Athanasiou. Endogenous productivity and equality of opportunity
91 -- 125Bezalel Peleg, Shmuel Zamir. Extending the Condorcet Jury Theorem to a general dependent jury
127 -- 140Elchanan Mossel, Omer Tamuz. Complete characterization of functions satisfying the conditions of Arrow's theorem
141 -- 170Rosa Camps, Xavier Mora, Laia Saumell. A continuous rating method for preferential voting: the complete case
171 -- 205Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Ðura-Georg Granic. Two field experiments on Approval Voting in Germany
207 -- 251Stephen Bazen, Patrick Moyes. Elitism and stochastic dominance